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McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
Hugo Castellanos Monzón1 appeals the District Court’s 
denial of the Petition he filed pursuant to the Hague 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction (the “Convention”)2 and the International Child 
Abduction Remedies Act (“ICARA”),3 seeking the return of 
his minor child, H.C.  Subject to certain exceptions, both the 
                                                                
1 Inasmuch as the transcripts establish that Appellant refers to 
himself simply as “Hugo Castellanos,” we will refer to him as 
“Castellanos.” 
2 Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, 22514 U.N.T.S. 98 
[hereinafter Hague Convention]. 
3 Codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9008, 9010-9011. 
3 
Convention4 and ICARA5 mandate the return of a child to the 
custodial parent when the other parent wrongfully removes or 
retains the child in violation of the requesting parent’s custody 
rights.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.6 
 
I. 
A. Factual Background 
 
Castellanos married Appellee De La Roca in 2004.  
Their son, H.C., was born in 2010.  The couple separated 
shortly thereafter in November 2011, and formally divorced by 
mutual consent in January 2014.  
 
Castellanos and De La Roca have divergent narratives 
regarding their separation and divorce.  De La Roca claims that 
violence was a factor.  Although she did not raise that issue in 
the divorce proceedings,7 she now claims that she feared for 
her safety during the relationship.  Responding to Castellanos’s 
Petition for H.C.’s return, she claimed that Castellanos verbally 
and physically threatened her by speeding and driving 
recklessly while she was pregnant and a passenger in his car.  
She also claimed that Castellanos attempted to visit H.C. more 
often than the couple had agreed to after their separation when 
she became H.C.’s primary guardian.  According to De La 
Roca, this resulted in arguments between her and Castellanos.  
De La Roca claims that Castellanos showed up at her home late 
at night, approached her, threatened to kill himself, and 
                                                                
4 Article 1 of the Convention sets forth two primary 
objectives: “(a) to secure the prompt return of children 
wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State; 
and (b) to ensure that rights of custody and of access under 
the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in 
the other Contracting States.” Karpenko v. Leendertz, 619 
F.3d 259, 263 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Hague Convention, 
supra note 2, at art. 1).  
5 ICARA serves in the United States as the implementing 
statute for the Convention.   
6 On August 30, 2018, we entered an order granting panel 
rehearing and vacating the order and nonprecedential opinion 
which we initially filed in this matter.  
7 Monzon v. De La Roca, No. 16-0058, 2016 WL 1337261, at 
*2 (D.N.J. Apr. 5, 2016). 
4 
demanded H.C.  Castellanos categorically denies all of De La 
Roca’s allegations of abuse.  
 
1. De La Roca’s New Relationship and Ties 
to the U.S. 
In the summer of 2013, after her separation from 
Castellanos, but before they divorced, De La Roca began a long 
distance relationship with her childhood acquaintance, 
“Deleon,” who resided in New Jersey.  De La Roca testified 
that she obtained a visa for H.C. to travel to the United States 
with Castellanos’s consent, though she did not immediately 
bring H.C. to the U.S.  Instead, she took several trips to visit 
Deleon by herself.  However, she eventually traveled to New 
Jersey and married him in March of 2014.  She did not tell 
Castellanos about the marriage.  
 
Shortly after marrying Deleon, De La Roca told 
Castellanos that she intended to bring H.C. to the United States 
to live; Castellanos refused to consent.  In or around March of 
2014, De La Roca filed a domestic violence complaint against 
Castellanos in Guatemala and obtained a temporary restraining 
order.  However, she failed to appear at the hearing to make the 
TRO permanent because she had already moved to New Jersey 
before the final hearing. 
 
 In July of 2014, De La Roca took H.C. to the United 
States.  She testified that she decided to ignore Castellanos’s 
denial of consent because she “could not explain to [her] 
aggressor that [she] was leaving.”8  A month after taking H.C. 
to New Jersey, she sent Castellanos a text message informing 
him she was there with H.C.  She did not disclose their exact 
address “[o]ut of fear that he would come [to New Jersey] to 
do the same thing as in Guatemala.”9   
 
2. Castellanos’s Efforts to Invoke the 
Convention 
On August 23, 2014, Castellanos filed an Application 
for Return of the Child under the Convention with the Central 
                                                                
8 Id. at *4. 
9 Id.  
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Authority in Guatemala.  The Guatemalan Authority 
forwarded that application to the United States Department of 
State.  About 16 months later, on January 5, 2016, having 
discovered that the Convention required him to file where H.C. 
lived, Castellanos filed the instant Petition for Return of the 
Child (the “Petition”) in the District Court of New Jersey.  
 
B. Legal Background 
1. The Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction  
Article 1 of the Convention has two primary objectives: 
“(a) to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully 
removed to or retained in any Contracting State; and (b) to 
ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law of one 
Contracting State are effectively respected in the other 
Contracting States.”10  The Convention requires that the 
petitioner seeking return of the child bear the initial burden of 
showing that the child was habitually resident in a State 
signatory to the Convention and was wrongfully removed to a 
different State, as defined by Article 3.   
 
Where a court determines a child has been wrongfully 
removed, Article 12 of the Convention provides that the child 
is to be returned “forthwith,” as long as the proceedings have 
been “commenced” in the “judicial or administrative authority 
of the Contracting State where the child is” less than one year 
before the date of wrongful removal.11  But where the 
petitioner fails to commence the proceedings before the one-
year deadline, s/he is no longer entitled to the child’s automatic 
return.  Instead, a rebuttable presumption arises whereby the 
child’s return is subject to certain affirmative defenses, 
including demonstration that “the child is now settled in its 
new environment.”12 
 
The Convention sets out a total of five defenses to a 
Contracting State’s duty to return the child.  The first is the one 
                                                                
10 Karpenko, 619 F.3d at 263 (quoting Hague Convention, 
supra note 2, at art. 1). 
11 Hague Convention, supra note 2, at art. 12. 
12 Id.  
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just mentioned: where the child is well settled in his or her new 
environment.13  A second exception applies where the 
petitioner was not exercising custody rights at the time of the 
child’s wrongful removal or retention, or acquiesced in the 
removal or retention.14  A third exception applies where “there 
is a grave risk that [the child’s] return would expose the child 
to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child 
in an intolerable situation.”15  There is a fourth exception if the 
child objects to being returned and has “attained an age and 
degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of 
[the child’s] views.”16  The fifth and final exception is where 
“[t]he return of the child . . .  would not be permitted by the 
fundamental principles of the requested State relating to the 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”17  
Significantly, the Convention establishes neither the degree of 
certainty nor the burden of proof that a respondent must 
establish to defeat the petition and retain custody of the child 
pursuant to these affirmative defenses.18 
 
2. The International Child Abduction 
Remedies Act (“ICARA”) 
Congress enacted ICARA to implement the 
Convention.19  Under ICARA, “the petitioner bears the initial 
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
child was . . . wrongfully removed.”20  “Once the petitioner 
                                                                
13 Id. 
14 Id. at art. 13a. 
15 Id. at art. 13b. 
16 Id. at art. 13. 
17 Id. art. 20.  Only the first (well-settled defense) and the 
third (grave risk defense) of these listed defenses are relevant 
to this case since they were the only defenses De La Roca 
made in response to the Petition. 
18 See infra Part III(A)(2) for a discussion of ICARA 
provision 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(2) and its explanation of 
burdens of proof for the exceptions. 
19 See, e.g., Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 221 (3d Cir. 
1995). 
20 Karpenko, 619 F.3d at 263.  In particular, a court must 
determine “(1) when the removal or retention took place; (2) 
the child’s habitual residence immediately prior to such 
7 
meets its initial burden, the respondent may oppose the child’s 
return by proving one of [the] five affirmative defenses” as 
listed under ICARA provision 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(2)(A) and 
(B).21  Section 9003(e)(2) provides: 
(e) Burdens of proof 
. . .  
(2) In the case of an action for the return of a 
child, a respondent who opposes the return of 
the child has the burden of establishing— 
(A) by clear and convincing 
evidence that one of the exceptions 
set forth in article 13b or 20 of the 
Convention applies; and 
(B) by a preponderance of the 
evidence that any other exception 
set forth in article 12 or 13 of the 
Convention applies.22 
Congress specifically required that these affirmative 
defenses be “narrowly construed to effectuate the purposes of 
the Convention.”23  Moreover, because of the very important 
policy objectives of the Convention and ICARA, courts retain 
the discretion to order the child’s return.  Thus, “even where a 
defense applies, the court has the discretion to order the child’s 
return.”24 
 
C. Procedural Background 
On January 5, 2016, Castellanos filed the Petition for 
the return of H.C. with the United States District Court of New 
Jersey.  Thereafter, the District Court held two days of 
                                                                
removal or retention; (3) whether the removal or retention 
breached the petitioner’s custody rights under the law of the 
child’s habitual residence; and (4) whether the petitioner was 
exercising his or her custody rights at the time of removal or 
retention.”   
21 Id.  
22 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(2) (emphasis added). 
23 Tsai-Yi Yang v. Fu-Chiang Tsui, 499 F.3d 263, 271 (3d Cir. 
2007) (internal citations omitted). 
24 Id.  
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hearings,25 which included the testimony of Castellanos, De La 
Roca, and two expert witnesses who testified on her behalf.26  
The first of those witnesses was Victoria Sanford, Ph.D., an 
expert on domestic violence against women and children in 
Guatemala.  She testified about “the police structure and 
government of Guatemala City.”27  The second witness was 
Robert T. Latimer, M.D., a psychiatric expert who interviewed 
H.C. at the start of the court case.28 
 
 After considering the evidence and the parties’ post-
hearing submissions, the District Court entered judgment in 
favor of De La Roca, thereby refusing to return H.C. to 
Castellanos.  However, the Court expressly declined to address 
De La Roca’s affirmative defense under Article 13b (H.C.’s 
return to Guatemala constitutes a “grave risk”).29  Instead, the 
Court concluded that De La Roca had successfully 
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence, that H.C. 
was well settled in the United States pursuant to ICARA,30 and 
                                                                
25 Monzon, 2016 WL 1337261, at *1.  Here, the District Court 
expressly declined to exercise its discretion to order H.C.’s 
return because it found that De La Roca had credibly testified 
that H.C. had become “well settled” in the U.S.  Id. at *10 
(“Respondent has established by a preponderance of the 
evidence that H.C. is settled in the United States and . . . I will 
not exercise my discretion to order H.C.’s return.”); Id. at *15 
(“Although the Court expressly declines to address the 
parties’ arguments concerning whether returning H.C. to 
Guatemala constitutes a ‘grave risk’ to H.C., nonetheless, in 
light of the testimony received from Dr. Sanders concerning 
how familial domestic violence is skewed unfairly against 
women by the culture and authorities in Guatemala, and 
Respondent’s testimony concerning her fear of Petitioner, 
both of which I find credible, I will not exercise my discretion 
to order the return of H.C. to Guatemala during the pendency 
of any future custody determinations.”). 
26 Id. at *1.   
27 Id. at *8. 
28 Id. at *9. 
29 Id. at *15. 
30 Id. at *10, *13; 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(2)(B) (corresponding 
to Hague Convention, supra note 2, at art. 12). 
9 
therefore decided not to exercise its independent authority to 
order H.C.’s return to Guatemala.  
 
II. DISCUSSION 
 
Castellanos makes three arguments on appeal.  He 
argues that the District Court erred in not finding that the notice 
he filed with the Guatemalan Central Authority and the U.S. 
Department of State constituted a “proceeding” for purposes of 
Article 12 of the Convention, thereby entitling him to have 
H.C. returned pending resolution of the custody dispute.  
Castellanos also claims the District Court erred in interpreting 
De La Roca’s burden under ICARA.31  Finally, he claims the 
District Court erred in finding that H.C. was “well settled” in 
the United States, and thereby denying H.C.’s return to 
Guatemala. 
 
A. 
 
Castellanos contends the District Court should have 
considered the application he initially filed with the 
Guatemalan Central Authority and the U.S. Department of 
State as a “proceeding” under ICARA.  He insists that by filing 
that notice when he first learned of H.C.’s removal, he acted 
“diligently” and “in accordance with the established methods 
of international communication between [U.S. and 
Guatemalan] Central Authorities.”32  He argues that he was 
“unable to overcome the language barrier, the lack of access to 
affordable legal representation, and certainty as to H.C.’s 
residence.”33  He therefore asserts that the resulting delay 
should not be attributed to him, and the “petition date” should 
therefore be the first of either a judicial filing or an application 
to the Central Authority, for purposes of the Convention.34   
 
ICARA defines “commencement of proceedings” as 
used in Article 12 of the Convention as “the filing of a petition 
in accordance with [§ 9003(b)].”35  Section 9003(b) provides, 
                                                                
31 Appellant’s Br. 9. 
32 Id. at 22. 
33 Id. at 22–23. 
34 Id. at 23. 
35 22 U.S.C. § 9003(f)(3). 
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in turn, that “[a]ny person seeking to initiate judicial 
proceedings under the Convention for the return of a child . . . 
may do so by commencing a civil action by filing a petition for 
the relief sought in any court which has jurisdiction of such 
action and which is authorized to exercise its jurisdiction in the 
place where the child is located at the time the petition is 
filed.”36  Accordingly, we cannot conclude that mere notice of 
one’s intent to have a child returned to the parent in a signatory 
state constitutes “commencement of proceedings” under 
Article 12. 
 
We realize that Castellanos tried to act diligently, and 
we are not unsympathetic to his efforts.  Nevertheless, our 
inquiry into what constitutes a proper filing for these purposes 
is circumscribed by the language of ICARA and the 
Convention.  We cannot ignore that language by extending it 
to include a document filed with either the Guatemalan Central 
Authority or the U.S. Department of State.37  If a parent pursues 
the remedies available for the return of his/her child under 
ICARA, Congress has clearly required that the parent do so by 
“filing a petition . . . in [a] court . . . where the child is 
located.”38  
 
As noted earlier, the timing of any such filing is crucial.  
When a child has been removed and “a period of less than one 
year has elapsed from the date of the wrongful removal or 
retention, the authority concerned shall order the return of the 
child forthwith.”39  Thus, at least one year must pass before a 
child can be considered sufficiently settled and no longer 
subject to automatic return to the other parent during the 
pendency of proceedings under the Convention and ICARA.  
“[I]f one year has elapsed since a child was wrongfully 
                                                                
36 Id. at § 9003(b) (emphasis added). 
37 See Monzon, 2016 WL 1337261, at *11 (quoting 22 U.S.C. 
§ 9003(b)) (“In this instance, Petitioner previously applied to 
Guatemala’s Central Authority for assistance in securing the 
return of H.C. However, that application was neither a 
substitute, nor a prerequisite, for commencing ‘proceedings 
before the judicial or administrative authority of the 
Contracting State where the child is.’”). 
38 22 U.S.C. § 9003(b). 
39 Hague Convention, supra note 2, at art. 12. 
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removed or retained when a petition is filed, a court must also 
determine whether the child is ‘settled in its new 
environment.’”40  Thus, “the ‘now settled’ exception only 
applies where the child has been in the destination state for 
more than one year from the date of the wrongful removal or 
retention.”41 
 
The delay in filing the Petition for H.C.’s return did not 
eliminate Castellanos’s remedies under the Convention,42 nor 
did it ensure De La Roca’s success in resisting the Petition for 
H.C.’s return.  Here, the District Court correctly recognized its 
continuing independent authority to order H.C.’s return; 
however, it declined to exercise this authority.  The Court 
stated, “I will not exercise my discretion to order the return of 
H.C. to Guatemala during the pendency of any future custody 
determinations.”43  Concomitantly, even if Castellanos had 
properly filed his petition in the New Jersey District Court 
within a year of H.C.’s removal, the District Court still could 
have exercised its discretion and denied H.C.’s return pursuant 
to the terms of the Convention.44  Therefore, although the one-
year filing requirement is important, the late filing did not 
ultimately determine H.C.’s custody.45   
 
B. 
 
When proceedings for a petition for the return of a child 
begin more than one year after the child’s removal, the 
                                                                
40 Yang v. Tsui, 416 F.3d 199, 203 n.4 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting 
Hague Convention, supra note 2, at art. 12).  
41 Hofmann v. Sender, 716 F.3d 282, 295 (2d Cir. 2013) 
(holding that “[b]ecause one year had not elapsed between the 
wrongful retention of the children and the institution of these 
proceedings under the convention, the district court’s 
determination that the ‘now settled’ exception does not apply 
must be affirmed.”). 
42 Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1, 14 (2014) (noting 
that “expiration of the 1–year period in Article 12 does not 
eliminate the remedy the Convention affords the left-behind 
parent—namely, the return of the child.”). 
43 Monzon, 2016 WL 1337261, at *15. 
44 See Hague Convention, supra note 2, at arts. 13, 20. 
45 See id. at art. 12. 
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Convention requires that the court “shall order the return of the 
child,” subject to specific affirmative defenses set forth in § 
9003(e).46  The petitioner has the initial burden of proving by 
a preponderance of the evidence that the child was wrongfully 
removed, whereupon “the respondent may oppose the child’s 
return” by establishing the “affirmative defenses” or 
“exceptions” as listed under ICARA provision 22 U.S.C. § 
9003(e)(2)(A) and (B).47 
 
In Tsai-Yi Yang, we explained the “four questions that 
must be answered in a wrongful removal or retention case” are 
as follows:  
[We] must determine (1) when the removal or 
retention took place; (2) the child’s habitual 
residence immediately prior to such removal or 
retention; (3) whether the removal or retention 
breached the petitioner’s custody rights under 
the law of the child's habitual residence; and (4) 
whether the petitioner was exercising his or her 
custody rights at the time of removal or 
retention.48 
De La Roca does not dispute the District Court’s conclusion 
that Castellanos established each of these four conditions for 
H.C.’s return under the Convention.49  Accordingly, De La 
Roca had to produce sufficient evidence to establish an 
                                                                
46 Id. 
47 Karpenko, 619 F.3d at 263.   
48 Tsai-Yi Yang, 499 F.3d at 270–71. 
49 Specifically, the District Court held: 
Petitioner met his initial burden of presenting a 
prima facie case of wrongful removal and 
retention under the Convention, i.e., that (1) the 
removal took place on July 17, 2014; (2) H.C.’s 
habitual residence immediately prior to the 
removal was Guatemala; (3) Petitioner had 
custodial rights to H.C. at the time of H.C.’s 
removal from Guatemala; and, (4) Petitioner was 
exercising those custodial rights at the time of 
H.C.’s removal from Guatemala. 
 
Monzon, 2016 WL 1337261, at *10.  
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affirmative defense to Castellanos’s Petition pursuant to 
subsection (e)(2) of ICARA.  
 
Recall that § 9003(e)(2) provides as follows: 
(e) Burdens of proof 
. . .  
(2) In . . . an action for the return of a child, a 
respondent who opposes the return of the 
child has the burden of establishing-- 
(A) by clear and convincing evidence 
that one of the exceptions set forth 
in article 13b or 20 of the 
Convention applies; and 
(B) by a preponderance of the 
evidence that any other exception 
set forth in article 12 or 13 of the 
Convention applies.50 
Castellanos insists that the use of the conjunctive “and” means 
that De La Roca must establish both prongs of § 9003(e)(2) by 
the specified burden of proof before his Petition for H.C. could 
be denied.51  He asserts with some force that Congress could 
have simply used the word “or” if it had intended for 
respondents to successfully resist a petition for return of a child 
by establishing only one affirmative defense under § 
9003(e)(2).52   
 
De La Roca asserted two affirmative defenses to the 
Petition—that H.C. is well settled in the United States, and that 
returning him to Guatemala would present a grave risk.  Under 
(e)(2)(A), a respondent must prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that (1) there is a grave risk that the child’s return 
would expose the child to physical or psychological harm;53 or 
                                                                
50 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(2) (emphasis added). 
51 Appellant Br. 11. 
52 Id. at 12; see Brown v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 119 
F.3d 922, 924 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (quoting 
Quindlen v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 482 F.2d 876, 878 
(5th Cir. 1973)) (As a “general rule, the use of a disjunctive in 
a statute indicates alternatives and requires that those 
alternatives be treated separately.”). 
53 Hague Convention, supra note 2, at art. 13b. 
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(2) the return should not be permitted by the fundamental 
principles of the requested State relating to the protection of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms.54  ICARA requires 
that a respondent only establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence that (1) the child is now settled in its new 
environment;55 or (2) the petitioner was not exercising custody 
rights at the time of removal.56 
 
According to Castellanos, use of the conjunctive “and” 
requires a respondent under the Convention to establish 
defenses of either a grave risk or violation of fundamental 
principles and either that the child is now settled or that the 
petitioner was not exercising custody rights when the child was 
taken from the petitioner.57 
 
Castellanos thus claims that the District Court’s reading 
of ICARA ignored a “critical layer of protection” expressly 
embedded in the statutory scheme and undermined the 
overriding goals of ICARA and the Convention.58 
 
1. A Literal Reading of ICARA Produces an Absurd 
Result 
 
“[C]ourts must presume that a legislature says in a 
statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. 
When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then this first 
canon [of statutory construction] is also the last: ‘judicial 
inquiry is complete.’”59  Only when a statute is ambiguous and 
includes disputed language “reasonably susceptible to different 
interpretations” should a court go beyond interpreting the text 
of a provision.60  Thus, Castellanos argues that the District 
Court here erred by prematurely ending its inquiry after 
                                                                
54 Id. at art. 20. 
55 Id. at art. 12. 
56 Id. at art. 13a. 
57 Appellant Br. 13 (emphasis added). 
58 Id. at 18. 
59 Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) 
(quoting Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981)). 
60 In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 304 (3d Cir. 
2010) (quoting Dobrek v. Phelan, 419 F.3d 259, 264 (3d Cir. 
2005)). 
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concluding that H.C. was well settled.  According to him, 
“[t]he plain language of section 9003 (e)(2)(A) of ICARA 
requires that the respondent also prove, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that one of the exceptions set forth in 
article 13b or 20 of the Convention [also] applies.”61 
 
Castellanos’s conjunctive reading of § 9003(e)(2) 
appears, at first glance, to be correct.  Congress’ use of the 
conjunctive certainly suggests that it intended to require 
respondents to present an affirmative defense under both § 
9003(e)(2)(A) and its counterpart, § 9003(e)(2)(B), by the 
prescribed burdens of proof.  However, the result of that literal 
reading not only contradicts the underlying principles of the 
Convention and ICARA, it produces a patently absurd result.62   
 
“The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is 
determined by reference to the language itself, the specific 
context in which that language is used, and the broader context 
of the statute as a whole.”63  Here, the broader context of the 
statute strongly suggests that the “and” in § 9003(e)(2) is 
misleading insofar as it means that Congress intended that both 
prongs need to be satisfied.  “Statutory context can suggest the 
natural reading of a provision that in isolation might yield 
contestable interpretations.”64  Hence the Supreme Court’s 
reminder that “[s]tatutory construction . . . is a holistic 
endeavor.”65 
 
Logic dictates that the text of the Convention and its 
discussion of the affirmative defenses be interpreted as 
establishing that Congress intended them to apply 
                                                                
61 Appellant Br. 13 (citing 22 U.S.C.A. § 9003(e)(2)(A)). 
62 See First Merchants Acceptance Corp. v. J.C. Bradford & 
Co., 198 F.3d 394, 403 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly absurd results 
and ‘the most extraordinary showing of contrary intentions’ 
justify a limitation on the ‘plain meaning’ of . . . statutory 
language.”) (citing Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 75 
(1984)). 
63 Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997). 
64 In re Price, 370 F.3d 362, 369 (3d Cir. 2004). 
65 United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest 
Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988). 
16 
individually.66  The State Department itself suggested in its 
(albeit pre-ICARA) legal analysis of the Convention that only 
one of the defenses need be shown.  Its analysis stated: “a 
finding that one or more of the [affirmative defenses] provided 
by Articles 13 and 20 are applicable does not make refusal of 
a return order mandatory. The courts retain the discretion to 
order the child returned even if they consider that one or more 
of the [defenses] applies.”67   
 
Moreover, the Convention clearly establishes that 
certain defenses can defeat a demand for repatriation, and they 
can do so without any additional showing.  Article 12 provides 
that the well-settled exception controls, even in the absence of 
other considerations that mitigate in favor of a petition for the 
return of the child.  It commands: “The judicial or 
administrative authority, even where the proceedings have 
been commenced after [the lapse of one year from the date of 
the child’s wrongful removal], shall also order the return of the 
child, unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in 
its new environment.”68  The Convention also includes what 
appears to be a standalone defense to a child’s repatriation in 
Article 20: “[t]he return of the child under the provisions of 
Article 12 may be refused if this would not be permitted by the 
fundamental principles of the requested State relating to the 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”69   
                                                                
66 See Appellee Br. 16.   
67 Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and 
Legal Analysis, 51 FR 10494-01.  While the State 
Department’s own understanding of the Convention is 
persuasive, it should be noted this particular analysis was not, 
in fact, contemporaneous with the passage of ICARA.  The 
former was published in 1986, whereas the latter was codified 
in 1988. Note, this discretion applies despite the one-year 
provision. 
68 Hague Convention, supra note 2, at art. 12 (emphasis 
added).   
69 Id. at art. 20.  In its public statement analyzing the 
Convention, the State Department offered what it 
characterized as its “best explanation” for Article 20’s 
“unique formulation”: that “the Convention might never have 
been adopted without it.”  Hague International Child 
Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51 FR 
17 
 
Castellanos’s reading of § 9003(e)(2) would mean that 
even proof of an especially compelling defense could never, by 
itself, prevent a child’s return under the Convention.70  For 
example, even if it were proven by clear and convincing 
evidence the child faced a “grave risk . . . [of] physical or 
psychological harm”71 upon return, or that return of the child 
would violate “fundamental principles . . . of human rights,”72 
a court would be powerless to deny return unless it also found 
that the child was settled in its new residence. 
 
Our conclusion that the inclusion of “and” was not 
intended to suggest the conjunctive is not a cavalier attempt to 
reconcile inconsistences between ICARA and the Convention.  
Courts repeatedly resolve conflicts between treaties and Acts 
of Congress by the doctrine of implied repeal, with the latter in 
time prevailing; here, that is ICARA.73  Thus, although federal 
                                                                
10494-01.  The State Department specifically noted that the 
negotiating countries had been divided on the inclusion of 
Article 20, which it characterized as a “public policy 
exception in the Convention” allowing a court to excuse itself 
from returning a child “under some extreme circumstances 
not covered by the exceptions of Article 13.” Id.; see also 
Souratgar v. Lee, 720 F.3d 96, 108 (2d Cir. 2013) (“The 
defense is to be invoked only on the rare occasion that return 
of a child would utterly shock the conscience of the court or 
offend all notions of due process.”) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted).  
70 See Griffin v Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 
(1982) (“[I]nterpretations of a statute which would produce 
absurd results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations 
consistent with the legislative purpose are available.”); 
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 515 
(1989) (“Interpreting . . . literally would produce an absurd 
result, which the Legislature is strongly presumed not to have 
intended”) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
71 Hague Convention, supra note 2, at art. 13(b). 
72 Id. at art. 20. 
73 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957); United States v. 
Enger, 472 F. Supp. 490, 542 (D.N.J. 1978) (“[C]onflicts 
between [treaties and Acts of Congress] are resolved by the 
doctrine of implied repeal, with the later in time prevailing.”). 
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statutes and treaties are accorded the same weight, when a 
treaty conflicts with provisions of subsequently enacted 
legislation, the offending provisions of the treaty are deemed 
null and void.74 
 
The Supreme Court has explained that ICARA “does 
[not] purport to alter the Convention,” and “Congress’ mere 
enactment of implementing legislation did not somehow 
import background principles of American law into the treaty 
interpretation process, thereby altering our understanding of 
the treaty itself.”75  Moreover, Congress has declared that 
ICARA does not abrogate any of the remedies under the 
Convention.  Congress explained that “[t]he remedies 
established by the Convention and this chapter shall be in 
addition to remedies available under other laws or international 
agreements.”76  Accordingly, notwithstanding Congress’ use 
of the conjunctive “and” in relation to burdens of proof and 
affirmative defenses in drafting ICARA, logic and the 
fundamental principles underlying ICARA and the Convention 
preclude us from concluding that Congress thereby intended to 
alter the Convention in a way that would contradict 
fundamental principles of human rights.  Therefore, we will not 
interpret ICARA in a manner that results in a statutory scheme 
that diverges from, and creates remedies inconsistent with, 
basic concepts of human rights, decency, and child welfare by 
adopting Castellanos’s reading of § 9003(e)(2).   
 
2. Precedent Supports a Disjunctive Reading of Section 
9003(e)(2) 
 
We have consistently allowed prevailing parties to 
demonstrate only one affirmative defense to petitions under the 
                                                                
74 Reid, 354 U.S. at 18. 
75 Lozano, 572 U.S. at 13.  
76 22 U.S.C. § 9003(h); see also § 9003(d) (“The court in 
which an action is brought [for a petition for return of the 
child] shall decide the case in accordance with the 
Convention.”).   
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Convention.77  We have pronounced, for example, that “[a]fter 
a petitioner demonstrates wrongful removal or retention, the 
burden shifts to the respondent to prove an affirmative defense 
against the return of the child to the country of habitual 
residence.”78   
 
Other circuit courts of appeals agree.79  For example, the 
                                                                
77 See, e.g., Tsai-Yi Yang, 499 F.3d at 278 (“[E]ven if the 
respondent meets his or her burden of proving the affirmative 
defense, the court retains the discretion to order the return of 
the child if it would further the aim of the Convention which 
is to provide for the return of a wrongfully removed child.”) 
(emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted); In re 
Application of Adan, 437 F.3d 381, 389 (3d Cir. 2006) (“A 
wrongful removal may nonetheless be justified if one of the 
following exceptions applies . . . .”) (emphasis added); Baxter 
v. Baxter, 423 F.3d 363, 368 (3d Cir. 2005) (“If the court 
finds wrongful removal or retention, the burden shifts to the 
respondent to prove an affirmative defense to the return of the 
child to the country of habitual residence under article 13 of 
the Convention. The respondent must prove the defense of 
consent or acquiescence to the removal or retention by a 
preponderance of the evidence, or the defense of a grave risk 
of harm by clear and convincing evidence.”) (emphases 
added). 
78 Karkkainen v. Kovalchuk, 445 F.3d 280, 288 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(emphasis added). 
79 See, e.g., Rydder v. Rydder, 49 F.3d 369, 372 (8th Cir. 
1995) (noting that a respondent who opposes a child’s return 
“may advance any of the affirmative defenses to return listed 
in Articles 12, 13, or 20 of the Hague Convention.”) 
(emphasis added); Miller v. Miller, 240 F.3d 392, 402 (4th 
Cir. 2001) (“In fact, the courts retain the discretion to order 
return even if one of the exceptions is proven.”) (emphasis 
added; internal citations omitted); Ohlander v. Larson, 114 
F.3d 1531, 1534 (10th Cir. 1997) (the Hague Convention 
“provides for several exceptions to return if the person 
opposing return can show any” of the listed exceptions) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted; emphasis 
added); Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1067 (6th Cir. 
1996) (“Once a plaintiff establishes that removal was 
20 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that if a 
petitioner has established a prima facie case under the 
Convention, the child must be returned to his or her place of 
habitual residence unless the respondent can establish one of 
four narrow defenses.80  It elaborated: 
Two [defenses] may be established only by 
“clear and convincing evidence” —either that 
“there is a grave risk that [the child's] return 
would expose the child to physical or 
psychological harm or otherwise place the child 
in an intolerable situation,” pursuant to Article 
13(b) of the Convention, or that return of the 
child “would not be permitted by the 
fundamental principles . . .  relating to the 
protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms,” pursuant to Article 20. In contrast, 
the other two exceptions to the presumption of 
repatriation need only be established by a 
preponderance of the evidence—either that 
judicial proceedings were not commenced within 
one year of the child’s abduction and the child is 
well-settled in the new environment, pursuant to 
Article 12 of the Convention, or that the plaintiff 
was not actually exercising custody rights at the 
time of the removal, pursuant to Article 13(a) of 
the Convention.81 
Accordingly, the District Court for the Southern District 
of New York, in Lozano, denied a petition for return of a five 
year-old child upon a finding that the respondent demonstrated 
that the child had become settled in her new environment.82  
Not only did the court deny the petition based solely on a 
finding of only one affirmative defense, the court also 
specifically ruled that the respondent had not established either 
of the other three affirmative defenses.83  Thus, one defense 
                                                                
wrongful, the child must be returned unless the defendant can 
establish one of four defenses.”) (emphasis added). 
80 Blondin v. Dubois, 189 F.3d 240, 245 (2d Cir. 1999). 
81 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
82 In re Lozano, 809 F.Supp.2d 197, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).  
83 Id.  
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was sufficient.  
 
That decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit,84 and thereafter the Supreme Court upheld 
the district court’s refusal to return the child based solely on 
the “now settled” exception and a finding that equitable tolling 
of the one-year period was not available.85   
 
V. 
 
Castellanos also complains that De La Roca did not 
actually offer sufficient evidence to prove that H.C. was well 
settled in the United States.86  We review a district court’s 
factual findings for clear error.87  Contrary to Castellanos’s 
claim, the District Court undertook an exceedingly thorough, 
careful, and thoughtful analysis of the evidence and the various 
factors that pertain to how well a child is settled in a 
community and home.88  We are satisfied that this record 
                                                                
Respondent has failed to establish that sending 
the child back to the United Kingdom for a 
custody determination would expose the child to 
a grave risk of harm or place her in an intolerable 
situation. However, Respondent has 
demonstrated that at the time the Petition was 
filed, the child had been in New York for more 
than a year and has become settled in her new 
environment. 
 
Id. 
84 Lozano v. Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41, 59 (2d Cir. 2012). 
85 Lozano, 572 U.S. at 8, 18; see also id. at 19 (Alito, J., 
concurring) (“This is why Article 12 requires return 
‘forthwith’ if the petition for return is brought within a year of 
abduction, unless one of the narrow exceptions set forth in 
Article 13 or 20 applies.”) (emphasis added).  
86 Appellant Br. 8. 
87 See Ragan v. Tri-County Excavating, Inc., 62 F.3d 501, 506 
(3d Cir. 1995).  
88 See Monzon, 2016 WL 1337261, at *11–15.  
 
A survey of case law reveals that the factors 
courts typically consider in making this 
22 
supports the District Court’s finding that H.C. is well settled in 
his new environment.89  There was no error in reaching that 
conclusion, let alone any clear error in doing so.90  
 
 
 
VI. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court. 
                                                                
determination include: (1) the age of the child; 
(2) the stability of the child’s new residence; (3) 
whether the child attends school or daycare 
consistently; (4) whether the child attends church 
regularly; (5) the stability of the parent’s 
employment or other means of support; (6) 
whether the child has friends and relatives in the 
area; (7) to what extent the child has maintained 
ties to the country of habitual residence; (8) the 
level of parental involvement in the child’s life . 
. . .  
 
Id. at *12. “Here, the Court finds that . . . Factors One, Two, 
Three, Four, Five, Six, and Eight weigh in favor of finding 
that H.C. is settled in the United States . . . .” Id. at *13. 
89 See id. at *15; see also Werner Machine Co. v. Manning, 
129 F.2d 105, 105 (3d Cir. 1942) (holding that judgment 
should be affirmed where a district court’s judgment is 
supported by its findings of fact). 
90 Although we mention this argument, we note that 
Castellanos has actually waived it because he failed to 
develop this argument beyond two sentences in the 
“Summary of Argument” section of his brief. See Laborers’ 
Int’l Union of N. Am., AFL–CIO v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 26 
F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994) (“An issue is waived unless a 
party raises it . . .  and . . . a passing reference to an issue … 
will not suffice to bring that issue before this court.”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
